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1) Introduction
The growth of the Brazilian economy during President Lula's tenure (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) has been limited and uneven, far below the Latin American average and further below the average of other "emergent" countries such as China, India and Russia. Such performance cannot be ascribed to international conditions -quite the contrary, those have been exceptionally favorable. Its causes have to be sought internally.
Given the uncertainty inherent to a development process, growth is facilitated if there exists a "development convention" -if social actors partake of an agenda which defines the hierarchy of problems to be solved and the hierarchy of solutions to those problems. In other words, if there is a "development project' which reduces uncertainty and induces coordination of the strategies of the social actors 2 . From its very beginning the Lula government recognized the need for a development project and, in fact, put forward several proposals, discussed below. Such abundance of proposals is selfdefeating for the purposes of uncertainty reduction and agent coordination.
This paper argues that both phenomena -slow and uneven growth and lack of a development project -have a common root: the dominance of economic policy by a coalition of interests structured by high interest rates. Such financial dominance is 1 Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro. This paper was written during my stay at the Centre d'Économie de Paris Nord (Université Paris XIII) as part of a research project on development theory and policies. It was written for a conference on the Lula Government at the MSH/UP13 and it is based on a text on the ambiguities of development projects in Brazil since the nineties, when the neo-liberal project became dominant, prepared for a conference sponsored by the Institut CDC pour la Recherche on "Argentine, Brésil: sorties de la crise?", Paris November 2007. Comments from the audience of that Conference and from Ricardo Bielschowsky, Fernando Carvalho, François Chesnais, Fábio Sá Earp, Robert Guttmann, Jaime Marques-Pereira, André Modenesi, João Saboia and Pierre Salama helped to shape the present article but they should not be held responsible for its content. 2 If one looks at the Brazilian history since the end of the Second World War, one can identify two distinct periods: the first, going from the fifties to the eighties, when a "developmental" convention ruled and another, from the nineties to the beginning of the present century when a neo-liberal convention was dominant. In between lies the eighties, the "lost decade", in which energies were concentrated (and wasted) on solving the double problem of the external debt and rampaging inflation. See Castro (1993) for a good analysis of the growth and stability conventions prevailing during the developmental period.
expressed by the monetary and fiscal policies led by the Central Bank and the Finance Ministry and justified in terms of price stability, which is posed as a pre-condition to any development project.
Since "history matters" and path-dependency plays a major role in our argument, the Section 5 presents the growth record of the period and the constraints the macroeconomic policy puts on growth.
The last section suggests some interpretations of the Brazilian case on the light of recent development theory and of the experience of other countries.
2) Setting the stage: Uncertainty and change in 2003
In every culture the first day of the year is heavily laden with the symbolism of With such background Lula stood out as novelty in the Brazilian political scene, in stark contrast, for instance, with his two predecessors, Collor and Cardoso, the former a scion of a traditional family of entrepreneurs and politicians from the Northeast and the latter coming from the upper middle class of Rio and São Paulo. The media repeatedly pointed out his lack of formal education and his grammatical mistakes, comparing them to the fluency in other languages of his predecessors and the great academic prestige of Cardoso. Small wonder that Lula insists over and over on the importance of education for the people.
If Lula was a novelty, not less was the PT. For the first time Brazil had a textbook political party -an institution with a militant membership, connected to the many social movements directed to the under-privileged -landless peasants, slum dwellers, Indians, etc. A grass-roots party with a strong tradition of internal debate, the PT had forcefully promoted the idea of participatory democracy 4 . It was stronger in the more developed parts of the country and weaker in the Northeast and North regions, where the more traditional "clientelistic" politics prevailed. To make it worst, the PT defined itself as "socialist", although what was meant by socialism was not altogether clear. In its 2001 Congress it laid down "rupture with the prevailing model" as its main electoral plank.
By 2002 it was the fourth time Lula was a candidate for the Presidential seat. At the first time, in 1989, he was defeated by a narrow margin by Fernando Collor de Melo -a vote well summarized by Luciano Martins (1990) as the vote of "protest and fear".
Protest against the lost decade and fear of the former worker. In the following election (1994) he lost to Fernando Henrique Cardoso who, as Finance Minister, had supervised the stabilization plan which brought the period of high and sustained inflation to an end. During the campaign the media suggested repeatedly that Lula would undo the Real Plan. Finally, in 1998, Cardoso got reelected, in spite of a looming foreign exchange crisis, stemming from its policy of keeping the real overvalued to curb internal prices. Uncertainty about how the PT would manage the crisis and the still 3 In a 1997 interview Lula said that the General governing such period would have won a free direct election (Costa Couto, 1999) . 4 As exemplified by the budgeting process in some of the cities it administered, such as Porto Alegre, host to the Social Forum, the rallying point of anti-globalization movements throughout the world.
positive results of price stability for the poorer strata of the population played an important role in this outcome.
In 2002 the candidate from Cardoso's party tried to play, once again, the fear card. The external conditions favored the game: the world economy was still reeling from September 11 and the dot.com debacle, Argentina was plunged into its deep debt crisis and war on the Gulf was imminent. In institutions where Lula electors were few the fear became operational: foreign investment dried up, the real devalued, and inflation estimates for the next year shot up 5 . A clear signal was given to the candidate and his team. The response was prompt, if ambiguous: in mid 2002, in a widely publicized statement (the Letter to the Brazilians) Lula, while reiterating the need to "change the model", committed his future government to "respect the contracts". Albeit with less publicity he also put out bridges to the "market" institutions, such as the powerful Banks Federation (FEBRABAN).
All cards worked partially only. On the one hand, the market indicators continued to deteriorate sharply during the second semester of 2002. On the other the population, besieged by low growth, high unemployment and, to cap, it by an energy crisis 6 , elected Lula 7 . As he put it: "hope gained over fear".
Therefore, at the first of January of 2003, in Brazil, the hopes for renewal were tinged with considerable uncertainty about the future. Among economists there were some points which were consensual: the need to resume growth and employment and to go back to some price stability and the constraints on both objectives posed by foreign exchange scarcity and infra-structure (especially energy and transports) availability.
Consensus stopped there: there was a wide array of dissent, going from whether the focus should lie on the productive structure (as in developmental times) or on institutions (as the neo-liberals argued), to the relative role State and market should play. Some specific solutions to the problems of stability and growth, such as the reform of the Social Security System, the formal independence of the Central Bank, the control of financial foreign capitals and the need for an industrial policy were especially 5 A detailed description of the 2002 crisis can be found in the Open Letter of the President of the Central Bank to the Finance Minister explaining why the inflation targets of 2002 were not met. Meirelles, 2003 6 The energy crisis was a result of the combination of limited rainfall and of the hasty privatization of the sector, sold out to foreign investors to get precious foreign exchange. It contributed in no small way to demoralize the second Cardoso government. 7 See Rennó and Spanakos (2006) for an analysis of the backward looking behavior of the Brazilian electorate.
divisive. A clear indication of the course the new Government intended to take was urgently needed.
3) Development Projects Galore
On January first 2003 President Lula made two Inauguration speeches: one to the festive huge crowd assembled in front the Planalto Palace and another, longer and more formal, at the Congress 8 .
Addressing the Congress, Lula reiterated that "change was the key-word", that the previous model was defunct. Nonetheless, change had to be gradual, pursued with patience and perseverance. To do so, he stressed, a national development project was necessary, as well as a strategic planning.
Such project should be directed primarily to the needs of the underprivileged -it should focus on the provision of education and health and, above, all, on hunger. As a result, he expected an improvement on the self-esteem of the Brazilian people.
As means to such objectives he stated the need for macroeconomic stability and, specifically, a responsible management of public finances. Growth would be a result of an increase in savings and investment, including here human capital. The focus would lie on the internal market, especially on small and medium-sized enterprises, on infrastructure and on technological capability. A wide range of institutional reforms was mentioned: social security, fiscal, agrarian, labor legislation and political. In order to carry on such ambitious program he pleaded for a "social pact" uniting labor and capital in order to generate a "solidarity energy".
On the international front he also intended to introduce changes. Regionally, he intended to ascribe top priority to South America. Tradewise, he wished to reduce the protectionism of the more industrialized countries and increase the technological content of Brazilian exports. Foreign direct investment was welcome but its role was not emphasized -a substantial change as regards the Cardoso government, when foreign investment was seen as the demiurge of development.
Silence is as eloquent as speech. Financial capital, be it foreign or local, is not even mentioned. Political parties are given short shrift too. Fazenda, 2003) toed the line by stating that the "social inclusion" was the central axis of a "new development cycle" but made the point that the level of social expenditures made by the Brazilian State was already high -the problem was that such expenditures (notably transfers associated with social security) had "non-poor" as beneficiaries. In other words, social policy in Brazil was inefficient. To remedy that, policies directed to social inclusion should focus on the "poor" only, in opposition to the traditional PT view that social policies should be "republican and universal".
As expected, the Finance Ministry reiterated that inflation control was essential and put emphasis on the fiscal policy to stabilize prices. Moreover, priority should be given to institutional reforms which would have as their "unifying theme" the "importance of institutional and legal development for the appropriate working of markets and public policies". New Institutional Economics was a clear inspiration to the Finance Minstry team, which specified their four priority reforms: two were directly geared to fiscal problems: social security and fiscal reform itself, the other two to the financial system: the legal autonomy of the Central Bank and the reinforcement of the rights of creditors, assuming that the latter would then reduce interest rates. virtuous circle between the demand of workers' households for consumer goods and investment, leading to productivity increase, lower prices and more exports. The virtuous circle required an increase of the real wage of workers' families. However, given the scarcity of jobs and market failures which reduced the transfer of productivity growth to wages, policies were required to compensate for such failures. As a consequence, the "social" objectives of inclusion and reduction of inequality would converge with the "economic" operation of the virtuous circle. nanotechnology and biotechnology. Later on, biomass was added to the list. Although pharmaceuticals could be justified in terms of its social importance, the rationale of PITCE was not dependent on its direct impact on "social inclusion".
To sum it up, during the first year of the Lula government we had at least three different interpretations of his call for a "development project". This ambiguity precluded the "strategic planning" he argued for in his Inauguration speech of the first mandate. The macroeconomic policy later described compounded the difficulties.
Four years later, reelected but with no festive crowd in front of the Palace, he made a new Inauguration speech at the Congress. The underprivileged continued to be its priority, but "change", now, should be "fast". The "strategic vision of development" and the "social pact" were to be based on the twin pillars of public and private investment, directed mainly to a Program to Accelerate Growth (PAC). As soon became clear the 12 As later events showed, such analysis underestimated the weight on the Brazilian export performance played by the "China factor" and the ensuing increase in the demand for primary products and manufactures of low technology intensiveness 13 I must "declare an interest": I was part of the group which prepared the PITCE and was responsible for its implementation at the National Development Bank during 2003/4. Moreover, I am unashamedly sector-oriented as far as industrial policies go.
latter is essentially a large program (more than R$ 500 billion, i.e. US$ 290 billion) of investments in infra-structure, of which about 55% would go to energy projects, a third to urban infra-structure and the rest to logistics.
If well succeeded such Program would reestablish the old developmental pact, in which coalesced the whole chain of supply of constructions goods and services, suppliers of capital goods and workers (mostly with low educational requirements).
4) The compromise: macro-economic and social policies
In practice, the Lula government implemented bits and pieces of all the projects outlined above. We shall initially comment on the 2003 projects, leaving the comments on the 2007 project after a description of the macroeconomic policy.
Fiscal and social security regulations were changed in order to provide incentives to private investment and to reduce retirement and pension expenditures. Foreign investment in public debt securities also got fiscal incentives.
The financial system got the increased protection of creditor's rights and, at least as important, the right to lend money to private individuals with the payment of the debt being deducted from their monthly wages (i.e. a payroll-backed low-risk credit).
As regards PITCE, budget allocations and credit incentives for innovation and for strengthening the relationship between enterprises and universities and research centers increased. Fiscal and credit incentives to investment were provided too.
However, the evolution of international demand for raw materials (e.g. iron ore) and for semi-manufactured goods (e.g. steel slabs) eliminated the foreign exchange constraint and dampened the enthusiasm for technology-intensive sector policies, which have lingered. In fact, Brazilian trade policy has been directed more to expanding markets for products already exported rather than to diversifying the range of exports (Pinheiro and Bonelli, 2007) . Significantly, in the course of the Doha Round negotiations Brazil offered to further reduce tariffs on manufactures in exchange for a reduction by the advanced countries of protection given to primary products. On the import side, the policy of keeping a low exchange rate to brake inflation has increased imports of technology-intensive products, as predicted by PITCE, but this is seen by macro policy-makers as a bonus, since such imports should lead to short-term productivity gains, as stressed by the Finance Ministry in its 2003 document.
In other words, the role of PITCE as a vector of change of the productive structure has been reduced and its instrumentality turned to a more canonical "horizontal"
lineage. In development theory terms, the emphasis has shifted from a developmental neo-schumpeterian approach to an endogenous-cum-natural-comparative-advantage growth.
From the bits and pieces above mentioned, emerges a conservative slant. Change is indeed very gradual and conforming to established interests.
However, in my reading of it, the main thrust of the Lula government is to be found in the compromise between social policies, designed to achieve its economic and political objectives of improving the lot of the underprivileged and orthodox macroeconomic policies which benefit the financial coalition.
Social policies had two main strands. The first is the provision of basic services, The doubt was: would this tough and orthodox policy simply be a transition to more heterodox policies, such as advocated by many Brazilian post-keynesian economists and put into practice in the post-crisis Argentina, or would it be permanent?
Those who bet on the second alternative won.
To better understand Brazilian macro-policy it is helpful to explain some of its institutional traits. The Central Bank, which has a considerable say in the setting of the inflation target by virtue of its presence in the Monetary Council and its connection to the Finance Ministry, then enjoys full autonomy to set the interest rates which it deems necessary to achieve the goal -the decision is taken by a Committee (COPOM) composed only by Central Bank executives.
As explained by two of its members: "COPOM guides its policy decisions by its own forecasts for inflation in the relevant time horizon and the respective balance of risks. Market expectations of inflation are important inputs in the BCB's forecasting models… Expectations, in turn, have been influenced by past inflation behavior, the inflation targets, exchange rate and commodity price developments, economic activity and the stance of monetary policy" (Bevilaqua et al. 2007, p.5) . They believe that the 15 Part of the great power wielded by the Finance Ministry derives from a peculiarity of the Brazilian fiscal institutions. The yearly budget is prepared by Planning Ministry in consultation with other ministries (its main function nowadays), it is submitted to Congress, which has the power to amend it, and then it sanctioned by the President. Nevertheless, the budget is not mandatory: the Finance Ministry has the authority to reduce expenditures which are not legally earmarked (such as constitutional transfers to States). This provides a great scope for discretion in payments and it is, incidentally, a major source of political wrangling between the Executive and Legislative. 16 The inflation target has an admissible range of variation around its targeted centre, which shrunk from plus or minus 2,5% during 2003-2005 to 2% since then. 17 In January 2003 the Central Bank considered the situation critical and adjusted the targets for 2003 and 2004 (to 8.5% and 5.5%) . 18 IPCA, which includes consumers with up to 40 times the minimum wage"backward-looking component of market expectations has been ceding ground to the inflation target, evidence that the IT system is gaining credibility". However "credibility has not been perfect, so oftentimes inflation expectations seem to have over-reacted to current developments, in particular to upward inflation surprises. Thus the BC often had to act so as to prevent negative short-term developments from contaminating the medium-term outlook. In this sense the process of disinflation has been, and still is, a process of taming inflation expectations" (ibid).
The authors stress the importance of inflations expectations held by the financial sector but do not seem to worry about the possibility that the forecasts of the financial institutions may be influenced by the higher returns such institutions earn when the Central Bank raises its rate.
If the Central Bank fails to reach the target, its President has to write a public letter to the Finance Minister explaining this failure. Minute of COPOM meetings are available at the site of the Central Bank (bancocentral.gov.br) but such transparency does not apply to the Monetary Council.
Let us now take a look at the actual policies. As regards fiscal policy, the primary surplus targets were achieved: over 2003-2007 primary surplus was, on average, 4.1% of GNP, the highest average of a government since the mid-eighties, albeit at the cost of increasing the tax burden from 32 to 35% of GNP (Giambiagi 2007) . In 2007 the CMN excluded some public investment related to the PAC (amounting to 0.5% of GNP) from the primary surplus target.
As for inflation targets, they were also achieved, except in 2003. Moreover, in 2006 the rate of inflation was lower than the center target, a result repeated, less brilliantly, in 2007 when the inflation (4.46%) was slightly below the target (4,5%). Table 1 compares the target with the actual inflation rate over the period 2003-2007 and shows the declining trend of inflation, which testifies to the success of the macroeconomic policy (in its own terms). 
5) The doubtful path of growth
5.1) Consumer demand
Household demand depends on three factors: employment, earnings and credit. million, mostly in manufacturing industry (1.6 million) and commerce (1.5 million).
Moreover, formal employment increased -from 50% to 55% of total. Bearing in mind that about two-thirds of the new jobs created in the period covered by the Table was paid between one and two minimum wages (IEDI 2008), Table 3 second, the aggregate cost of labor may be more inflationary, since the industrial market is disciplined by international competition, contrary to services. From this year onwards, the rise of the minimum wage is pegged to the increase of GNP.
It is worthwhile to put such growth of earnings in a longer term prospective. As shown by Saboia (2007) the real minimum wage has gone back to level of the seventies (the "Miracle" period, of which the President is an enthusiast in economic terms), but still a third below its peak at the end of the fifties. As regards personal earnings, there are no such extended time series but Table 4 shows that the recovery imparted by the Lula government has but put back such earnings to a more "normal" level -a coming back from the 2003 crisis, but still below the 1996 peak. The typical behavior of Brazilian consumers is to check if the monthly installments they have to pay for a loan to buy a durable consumer good "fits" into their monthly disposable income, not bothering with the interest rate they are charged. On the other side, retail chains which sell durable and semi-durable consumer goods, auto dealers and realtors are loath to sell for cash, since they have long-established relationships with the financial system and earn considerable profits from the finance.
Consumer debt is higher in the group earning from one to three minimum wages. This debt-driven consumer expansion is no novelty in Brazil -it fits the observed historical pattern of consumer behavior and it is strongly reminiscent of the expansionary period of the late sixties and seventies. Politically, it broadens the social base of support of the Government by including the middle stratum of income which is not included either in the fiscal transfers of the Bolsa Família or in the rentier group.
Nonetheless, given the level of disposable income of the majority of households it is a rather frail base to support sustained growth. of GNP 25 -a substantial increase but which still leaves the stock of capital growing at a 2.5% per year 26 , insufficient for sustaining a fast expansion of GNP.
5.2) Investment
The low investment rates observed over the recent past cannot be disassociated from the macro-economic policy of high interest rates which has prevailed during its long period of decline. Such policy leads private investors to a portfolio where the hurdle rate of projects is heightened, since financial investment provide high alternative rates of profit and the financial cost of fixed and working capital is increased. Moreover, the short-term horizon and the remarkable fluctuations of the basic interest rate bias the investment portfolio towards projects with a short pay-off period. The valorization of the exchange rate, twin brother of the monetary policy, reduces the incentive to invest in activities which are geared to exports or import-substitution.
The Lula government has tried to compensate for such negative incentives deriving from the macroeconomic policy by granting fiscal incentives to investment and by reducing the basic interest rate charged by BNDES. (Giambiagi, 2007) . Since the tax burden seems to have reached its political limit, the Finance Ministry decided to exclude some investments (0.5% of GNP) from the primary surplus target in order to get the above mentioned infra-structure plan (PAC) under way.
Who invests under such circumstances? Tables 5 present a (Puga and Nascimento 2007) shows that the main difference lay in the share of construction (housing and non-housing). This confirms the consensus that those two areas are major problems. Housing deficit is estimated at 8 million units and Petrobras is pursuing an ambitious energy investment program and Eletrobras has substantial resources of its own, investing about 0.2% of GNP (Giambiagi 2007) . To elicit the private investment the Government set up a special fund for infra-structure with para-fiscal resources and BNDES has reduced the interest charged for such projects. Moreover, the Federal Government set up a complex system for monitoring the projects included in the Program.
At the end of 2007 the Government assessed that most projects were running according to schedule, an evaluation strongly denied by the press, which pointed out that many important projects were in fact far behind schedule and that less than 30% of the planned expenditures by the Federal Government had been actually performed. Such mishap seem to be due mainly to institutional difficulties, such as conflicts over the environmental impact of the projects and coordination between the Government and regulatory agencies.
Underneath such apparent governance difficulties lay deeper and unresolved questions regarding the role of the State in Brazil and the weight to be attached to objectives and timing.
As for the first, the Lula government inherited an incomplete transition from a State which was principal and agent to a State which delegated regulation to specialized agencies. In other words, the change from a developmental State to a liberal one was never completed. During the Lula years privatization was halted and the relationship between Executive and regulatory agencies has been strained (Central Bank excepted) but political and legal considerations have prevented a reversal of the process. The stalemate continues and its cost is paid in terms of poor governance and slower growth.
As for the second, there are strong conflicts within the Government and society about the relative to be attached to different objectives, such as fast capital accumulation and ensuing growth, on the one hand, and protection of the natural environment and international reputation on the other. Again: although the first objective has tended to predominate this is not followed up by the necessary institutional changes, leading to a process in which both objectives get thwarted: slower and lessened growth and limited environment protection.
In other words: the project to grow by infrastructure investment is hampered by political and institutional ambiguities, which, in turn, relate to the absence of a development convention. Such difficulties coalesce with the constraints imposed by the macroeconomic policy.
Investment in agriculture, as indicated by production of capital goods for this sector 27 has followed the international market, mediated by the exchange rate -it As for industry and mining, Table 6 Source: BNDES Note: sum may not total 100.00 because of rounding up.
As shown above, investment over the 2003-2006 period was concentrated in five sectors: oil and gas (50.6%) 28 , mining (15.2%), steel (7%), pulp and paper (4.4%) and petrochemicals (2.2%). Estimates for 2008-2011 indicate that the same sectors will increase their share to 83% of the total. Those are scale-and natural resources-intensive 28 Investment for alcohol production is for energy purposes, with an eye on the external market.
sectors, where projects are highly capital-intensive 29 , performed by large enterprises with access to foreign supplier credits, which tend to import a substantial part of their equipment, reducing thus their linkage to locally established machinery suppliers. Such investments are geared to import-substitution-cum-exports (oil and gas and petrochemicals) and to build scale-competitive plants in order to maintain market share in a growing world market (mining, steel and pulp and paper).
Therefore such estimates suggest that investment is still being led by the external sector. As shown by NEIT (2007) interest rate and overvalued exchange rate. Imports of capital goods and intermediary products far above the growth of local production explain the fast growth of imports shown in Table 2 . Such imports warm the heart of the Central Bank: they ease the inflationary pressures by rapidly increasing production capacity and total factor productivity. Nonetheless, reliance on imports to supply production goods fits better in the virtuous circle of an export-driven growth 32 than in the virtuosity of consumerinvestment growth. In fact, as shown above, the bulk of industrial investment is related to the external sector.
5.3) Big Brother is watching
The preceding analysis has highlighted the limitations the macroeconomic policy led by the Central Bank poses on the two growth regimes now envisaged by the Government Lula -consumer-led expansion and autonomous infrastructure investment.
Moreover, the policy reduces the incentive to invest in sectors which are geared to exports and/or import substitution, which actually are the main investors in Brazil. Not all difficulties stem from the policy, but the latter plays a significant role in the debate about the roles of the State and the market in directing decisions by firmly taking the side of the latter. It is unlikely that such a statement will accelerate investment decisions, since the latter are taken in firm-specific contexts -a classical problem of collective action.
Nonetheless it warns readers that the COPOM may raise the basic rate. As a consequence it increases the uncertainty about the evolution of demand and, paradoxically, may induce behavior of "wait and see" as regards investments directed to the internal market, which will reinforce COPOM's fears in the future, producing a vicious circle for growth.
In other words, to the uncertainty stemming from the international situation is added the uncertainty deriving from the power of the Central Bank.
But where from does this power come?
The traumatic experience of inflation during the period which goes from the failure in 1986 of the Cruzado plan of stabilization based on price controls, which local currency denomination tends to strengthen the links between the Finance Ministry, the Central Bank and the local financial system. The Bank's participation in the coalition does not imply a "capture" in public choice fashion -it suffices that the Central Bank and the private members of the coalition derive joint benefits from the same policy 38 . For instance, it is plausible to suppose that the recent reluctance of the Central Bank to increase the basic rate may be influenced by the high profits the financial system is earning with the present credit boom, which, in turn, increase the "soundness" of the system.
Power is a very strong driver and after the Real Plan the Central Bank has enjoyed enormous power. During the first Cardoso government (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) it imposed its quasi-fixed over-valued exchange rate policy, in spite of the opposition of very powerful interests (e.g. exporters, local industry besieged by import competition), even within the Government itself. Such power was increased under the inflation-targeting system adopted after the predicted foreign exchange crisis came true. Within the Lula government such power is even greater. Such power is justified by a technocratic pride in performing a role which is seen as pedagogic and therapeutic -"taming inflation expectations" say the COPOM members -no matter how much the medicine hurts.
The cohesion of this coalition is strengthened by a conservative bias: private interests want to preserve the highly profitable status quo, the Central Bank wants to preserve the price system. Both oppose structural changes which would alter wealth and income distribution and relative prices, increasing the risk of inflation. As a consequence the coalition uses its power not only to foster policies in its benefit but also to veto policies which may alter the status quo. "Development projects" which may lead to structural changes are therefore excluded.
The cohesion is further strengthened by how monetary policy is implemented.
The Central Bank has, as every regulatory agency does, to keep close and continuous contacts with the agents it regulates. Such contacts are formal and informal and they contribute to fashion a "common knowledge". The use of the inflation expectations of the financial institutions to calibrate the Central Bank own expectations is but an example of this process.
38 I thank Robert Guttmann for bringing this point to my attention.
Such "common knowledge" is strengthened by keeping the policy horizon short.
Inflation targets are set a year and a half ahead and COPOM meetings, where the policy may be changed, are held every forty days and are preceded by innumerable statements in the press by members of the financial community about their expectations about the COPOM decision.
As already pointed out, this produces substantive uncertainty over the long and short run. Such uncertainty and the short horizon are antithetical to the formation of a long-term development convention.
Finally, the cohesion of the coalition is strengthened by a shared belief in the legitimacy of the "market" to be the main institution in charge of organizing and driving the economy and the society. Such belief legitimates the use of their power to veto projects and policies which may reduce the power of the market in favor of other institutions. As such, the range of feasible development projects is severely restricted.
In this respect, the unresolved crisis of the State plays into the hands of the coalition. The developmental State, which led the country for thirty years 39 up to the end of the seventies, agonized during the eighties, losing legitimacy as growth petered out and inflation soared. The neo-liberal years, from 1990 to 2002, introduced some important changes, such as privatization of most State-owned enterprises but baulked at the prospect of introducing major political and administrative reforms which would make the State more politically representative and capable of a better governance.
Constrained politically at the Congress as it was economically by the above mentioned coalition, the Lula Government opted for an equally conservative strategy as regards the State. The relationship between the Executive and Legislative powers remained the same, participation of the civil society was translated into co-optation, a tradition going back to the thirties, and the reform of the system of political party system has been as cautious as it can be. Although space precludes a fuller discussion of such issues, it seems fair to conclude that the political strategy of the Government has reinforced the financial coalition, undermining further the Government efforts to launch a long term development project.
6) Conclusions
To sum it up, the preceding analysis argued that the Lula government put forward several development projects, implemented bits and pieces of such projects and has conducted a policy which benefits mostly the two extremes of the income range.
The macroeconomic policy followed by the Government limits all the long term development projects and has a built-in conservative bias against structural change.
I suggest that a political economy approach can help to understand such phenomena. More specifically, I suggest that a powerful coalition between private interests and the Central Bank developed over the last quarter of century, especially after the mid-nineties, which has the power to impose policies which benefit it and to veto alternative policies. The deadlock about the reform of the State has strengthened this coalition. Path-dependency and cumulativeness are strong factors in such process.
The international conditions which prevailed from the beginning of the Lula government until the last quarter of 2007 favored the macroeconomic policy it adopted.
Their change to the worse following the sub-prime crisis will reinforce the restrictive aspects of such policy.
The analysis is centered on the Brazilian case. Although this case presents some extreme features, such as the high interest rates charged and the income distribution, it is but one of a species 40 . Similar macroeconomic policies are practiced in most developed countries, Central Banks have adopted inflation-targeting as their best practice and the consequences are the same. Moreover, in countries where there was a strong tradition of State intervention, such as France, the stalemate about the roles of the market and State seem to be very similar to the Brazilian one.
To conclude, a comment on development theory. We all know the remark of Keynes about "practical men" being guided by long-dead economists. Theory, as history, matters.
I have equated above a "development project" to a "development convention".
The latter is to be understood as a cognitive device, shared by the hegemonic decisionmakers, which is used to establish a positive and a negative agenda: which problems come first and which solutions to such problems are legitimate. Such conventions are dubbed the Washington Consensus the "Universal Consensus" which "summarized the common core of wisdom embraced by all serious economists" are long past 41 However, behind the recognition of diversity and the caution about general recipes, lies unabated the belief in the need for "sound fundamentals". This is an expression with strong rhetorical power (as was "rational" expectations) because nobody is in favor of "unsound" fundamentals. The problem lies in how one defines "soundness".
The canonical answer now is fiscal equilibrium, low inflation and flexible exchange rate. Given soundness and a well working price mechanism, growth will follow suit. If it doesn't it is either because some institutions are not working properly (each case is different) and they should be reformed bearing in mind the context or/and because path dependency leads the agents to hold bad expectations about inflation. To remedy the latter, stick to your guns and keep firing until expectations change and a new trajectory is established. It takes time but, as one humorist has put it, "in the end all will 41 See Fukuyama (1989) and Williamson (1993 Williamson ( , p.1334 be well and if it is not well yet it is because it has not ended". The Central Banks have become the high-priests of this canon and to fulfill their role they must be free and independent.
Such definition partakes the faith on the market with the neo-liberal convention, but it is much more sanguine about macro-economic policy, as it takes a firmer stand on monetary and foreign exchange policies. Moreover, as mentioned above, its scope is more limited and its horizon shorter than the ones put forward by the neo-liberal convention.
Nonetheless, we have a "soundness" convention, with all its attributes. But, is it a development convention? In so far as development is interpreted as implying structural change and a long term prospective, the answer is negative. The developmental convention focused on changes in the productive structure, the neoliberal convention on the institutional structure. Both had a long term horizon. The "sound" fundamentalists focus on stability and it looks, at best, at the near future only.
It is, in this sense, essentially conservative, especially where the interests it serves are being well-cared for. The Brazilian case illustrates how well it works.
